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In the Copenhagen Accord of December 2009, developed countries agreed to provide 
start-up finance for adaptation in developing countries and expressed the ambition to 
scale this up to $100 billion per year by 2020. The financial mechanisms to deliver 
this support have to be tailored to country and sector specific needs so as to enable 
domestic policy processes and self sustaining business models, and to limit policy risk 
exposure for investors while complying with budgetary constraints in OECD 
countries. This paper structures the available financial mechanisms according to the 
needs they can address, and reports on experience with their application in bilateral 
and multilateral settings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
To avoid the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) overshooting a level at 
which climate dynamics could go out of control, developing countries must curb their 
upward emissions trends, in addition to drastic cuts in GHGs emissions of developed 
countries. 
 
The majority of emission reductions are expected to result from low-carbon and 
energy efficient investment choices. This is expected to result in incremental 
investment costs for the mitigation scenarios in the order of a few hundred billion 
dollars. Figure 1 shows that these volumes are relatively small compared to total 
annual investment volumes in developed and developing countries for the year 2030, 
which are projected by the International Energy Agency to be $12,000 billion and 
$7,000 billion respectively. 
 
The reason for this is rather straightforward: in the energy sector, the capital intensity 
per unit of production is likely to be higher, but this is compensated for by a lower 
energy demand due to higher energy efficiency. A similar phenomena exists in the 
transport and building sectors. This shows that the issue is less about changing the 
investment or consumption ratio of the current generation, and more about 
restructuring the investments. 
 
Debates about international climate policy architectures have often been driven by the 
search for a world carbon price, be it in the form of a cap-and-trade system or in the 
form of harmonized carbon taxes, in order to minimize costs of climate policies by 
abating carbon emissions where it is cheapest to do so. However, developing 
countries will not co-operate in implementing such carbon pricing approaches as long 
as they perceive environmental issues as a new form of Malthusianism. Therefore 
global carbon markets have received increasing attention as they are seen to allow 
both for financial transfers to developing countries and for the creation of a carbon 
price signal.  
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Figure 1. Developed and developing country investment volumes, in reference and 
low-carbon scenario for 2030, as projected by International Energy Agency 
 
However, the question remains whether mechanisms that implement carbon prices 
suffice to facilitate a low-carbon transition. Economists have identified a wide set of 
market failures that could prevent a low-carbon transition, even in the presence of a 
suitably defined carbon pricing regime;  
 
  Actors are not (fully) rewarded for innovation, experimenting and learning by 
doing because of spill-overs or because regulatory frameworks limit upside 
profit opportunities.  
  Time constraints limit the number of informed decisions individuals and firms 
can make. Hence energy and carbon savings opportunities might not receive 
the necessary attention. 
  Incomplete information about the performance of technologies and business 
partners creates risks. Hence firms hesitate to shift to new technologies, 
business practices or products. 
  Regulatory uncertainty creates risks for investors - policy changes could 
result in lower future carbon prices and lower profitability for low-carbon 
options. 
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  Network effects create situations where many actors have to coordinate their 
transition – ranging from training, infrastructure provision, technology 
manufacturing, installation, operation, maintenance, management.  
  ‘Imperfections’ in policy processes can delay the development of suitable 
regulatory and institutional framework thus creating barriers for new 
technologies and processes. 
 
These market failures are important in the context of developing countries and will 
not be corrected overnight given the political constraints to do so. In the case of low-
carbon transitions many of them may appear simultaneously and for many sectors it is 
unlikely that the carbon price alone can incentivize a low-carbon transition. This 
paper explores the different financial instruments that are available to national 
governments and the international community to address market failures or to 
compensate for their impact. Financial instruments can increase incentives or reduce 
costs for low-carbon investments, address risks, and can allow governments to signal 
or commit to regulatory stability. 
 
This is all the more important as in their accelerating pursuit of affluence, developing 
countries are set to build the bulk of their infrastructure in the next decades, rendering 
a bifurcation towards high-carbon development pathways irreversible in the near 
future. They will not slacken their pace in anticipation of a fully-fledged cap-and-
trade system in which they would receive emissions allowances, affordable 




Re-directing investments towards low-carbon infrastructures requires regulatory 
changes, public commitments to long-term programs, and tailored financial support 
and training. In short, a comprehensive set of actions capable of shifting a sector 
towards low-carbon development. It also requires a good interaction between 
domestic stakeholders (private investors and developing country governments) and 
                                                 
1 And all the more so, as a dispassionate reading of the situation drawn up by the Harvard project 
(Aldy and Stavins 2008) about the possible International Climate Policy Architectures suggests that 
none of them is likely to emerge in a near future 
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potential international supporters to tailor the form of the support to the specifics of 
each sector and even sub-sector. 
This shows that the problem is not so much capital shortage at the global level but the 
direction of savings, in a period when key emerging countries are capital exporters 
and some rich countries capital importers. The challenge is to maximize the 
leveraging effect of climate finance. This requires a financial architecture which 
includes risk-management and risk-sharing dimensions, one which can support 
mechanisms tailored to many types of domestic development policies, from the 
project level to the program level, and offer support to economic reforms.  
 
The paper therefore tries to delineate a form of taxonomy of the basic elements of a 
financial architecture from which a palatable deal could be derived, so as to accelerate 
the willingness of non-Annex 1 countries to accept significant pledges in a climate 
policy regime. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the nature of 
the different needs, and provides criteria to identify suitable financial support 
mechanisms. These are discussed in more detail in section 3, with reference to 
experience in climate change and development co-operation. Moving from the 
demand side of financial support, section 4 shifts to the supply side of financial 
support mechanisms, and discusses the experience of different bilateral and 
multilateral institutions in the provision of such mechanisms. Section 5 gives some 
insights about how to avoid the risk of a fragmentation of climate finance by showing 
its potential links with the reform of the international financial system.  
 
2. Financing Needs: what are we talking about? 
 
Most of the financial flows will come from institutions which are highly sensitive to 
the risk-return ratio of climate projects, including sovereign wealth funds, state and 
public pension funds, private and corporate pension funds, insurance companies, 
endowments, private banks, and investment management companies. The ratio for 
low-carbon investments will not compete with that of conventional projects as long as 
there is no credible and significant trend of rising carbon prices supported by a 
credible international climate architecture. But the ability of less-developed country 
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(LDC) governments (like any government) to commit to overcoming the transaction 
costs, which block institutional and economic reforms that would generate the number 
of projects, to realize the necessary economies of scale, in addition to lowering the 
investment risks, remains questionable.  
 
Development of an appropriate policy and regulatory framework demands reforms 
which touch a wide range of socially sensitive sectors like transportation and 
buildings, and the overall national architecture of public policy, including taxation, 
incentives/subsidies, pricing policies in energy and transportation, non-financial 
support mechanisms (e.g. standards, procurement, and urban planning). Developing 
country governments will not engage in such reforms without large-scale financial 
support for the initial investments required to implement these new regulatory 
frameworks, and for transition costs.  But this financial support is itself frozen by 
uncertainty over whether governments' will fulfil their commitments.  
 
Climate negotiation can break this double-bind, by providing incentives for 
governments not to default on their policy commitments, and to trigger climate 
finance which will in turn help governments to fulfil these commitments. Since a 
fully-fledged Kyoto-type architecture is not likely to be developed in time to provide 
such incentives, the key is in the financial devices themselves. But the negotiation so 
far as been framed in terms of additionality to official development aid, which is, in 
part, misleading: it focuses attention on a new ‘climate finance’ which could be 
additional to ‘normal finance’, whereas the big challenge is a re-allocation of 
investment flows.  
 
To explore the practical ways of maximizing this leveraging effect and to drastically 
change the portfolio of investors, we will start from two important although 
seemingly trivial reminders: 
 
First, low-carbon investments usually fall into one or both of the following categories: 
(i) substitution of operational costs with capital expenditures, for example energy 
costs for buildings or power plants are substituted with investment costs for insulation 
or renewable energy plants, (ii) a shift of capital expenditures, such as the shift from 
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high- to low-carbon technologies in many industrial processes and choices in energy 
infrastructure, but without attributable decrease in operational costs. 
 
Second, the choice of suitable financial instruments (aid, provision of loans, and 
credit guarantees versus direct financial transfers) must be made in the context of the 
microeconomic specifics of the project or program: and of the type of actors that are 
to be supported (governments, institutional investors, project developers). 
 
To illustrate the many facets of such financial devices and better understand how they 
can match the diversity of financing needs in the real world, we will explore, 
following the structure pictured in Figure 2, the choices between the various forms of 





























Figure 2. Financing instruments  
 
 
2.1 Incremental Cost Support versus Access to Finance 
 
To shift private investment to low-carbon options requires national governments to 
undertake one or both of the following actions: first, increasing their return, relative to 
carbon-intensive alternatives, by providing direct subsidies and/or increasing the costs 
of emitting for carbon intensive competitors by carbon pricing; second, reducing their 
risks, either by enhancing the stability of low-carbon policy frameworks, and/or by 
offering risk guarantees and/or by facilitating access to capital. 
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International financial mechanisms can support and complement these actions of 
national governments by: 
  providing direct grants to projects to cover incremental project costs or to 
create additional revenue streams, for example through carbon credits. 
International mechanisms can also provide financial support to countries as a 
contribution to the incremental costs which countries incur when 
implementing feed-in tariffs, supporting energy-efficient buildings, or 
introducing carbon pricing.  
  reducing financing costs through the provision of preferential loans and 
equity, or through public credit guarantees which reduce the costs of 
commercial loans by eliminating country, currency, policy, technology or even 
project risk. 
 
These two options are, in many cases, equivalent. It is common practice to measure 
the value of such support by the amount by which it reduces the need for grants, and 
to label it as grant-equivalent support. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the parameters which influence the relative merits of international 
support schemes providing direct transfers, versus facilitating access to finance. The 
small symbols, referring to insights from country policy case studies, illustrate how 
sector- and country-specific aspects influence the optimal choice. 
 
The structure of international financial support should be particularly geared towards 
providing access to finance, through loans, credit and risk guarantees or equity 
finance, where constraints in capital access prevent low-carbon projects. New 
technologies face high risks because the intrinsic uncertainty about their reliability 
and future maintenance costs (CSP in South Africa) is aggravated by uncertainty 
about the regulatory frameworks (Renewable Energy projects in Ghana, Energy 
Efficiency agricultural pump sets in India, and alternative transport infrastructure in 
Brazil). 
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Figure 3. Parameters determining whether a project/action is better supported with 
grants versus loans or credit guarantees 
 
Together, these factors prevent investors from providing large-scale finance for low-
carbon projects in developing countries, and limit financing sources to those private 
actors and funds which are prepared to bear higher risks in exchange for higher rates 
of return on employed capital. Credit guarantees can selectively remove some of the 
risk (e.g. currency, country, policy risk) and thus allow access to finance. Costs can 
therefore be reduced, and the necessary scale of low-carbon investment can be 
supported by institutions which are prepared to participate in financing. This process 
can be initiated or complemented by direct provisions of loans.  
 
Facilitating access to financing also allows projects to be pursued on a commercial 
basis and thus contributes to the development of sustainable business models. 
Publicly initiated and financed projects can only constitute a small share of the total 
volume of projects necessary to deliver low-carbon growth. Thus it will be important 
to develop sustainable business models to deliver low-carbon and energy efficient 
technologies (using the same examples as above). Provision of loans and credit 
guarantees to private actors can contribute to the development of business models and 
companies. This option also argues in favour of using risk guarantees and loans as 
instruments to provide financial support for low-carbon development in developing 
countries.  
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However, incremental costs of some new technologies are significant and can require 
additional support beyond grant-equivalent value of loans. In these cases, there 
may be insufficient collateral or income streams to provide capital to cover 
incremental investment cost. Grants can allow for local ownership, which is often 
seen to be essential for project success and to initiate microfinance schemes. 
 
Also initial learning and transaction costs create barriers that can be overcome with 
regulatory design, technology co-operation and some additional costs for initial 
projects. In this case, direct grants can be simple, and create low transaction costs. 
They also provide support, where benefits are difficult to appropriate by individual 
actors, e.g. from technology improvements through learning-by-doing. 
 
2.2 Up-front Support versus Support during Operation 
 
Direct support in the form of grants can be provided through up-front investment 
support or as support throughout the duration of the project. 
 
Up-front support is easy to implement and typically reduces transaction costs apt to 
block the project. It also can facilitate capacity building, for example as illustrated by 
a scheme of the European Investment Bank that pays for initial management fees of 
venture capital funds (European Investment Bank, 2007).  
 
However, this up-front support provides no hedging against moral hazard and no 
incentive to maximize the performance of projects. This is the lesson from up-front 
tax credits to support wind projects initially in California and later in India, and has 
resulted in the underperformance of many projects due to inappropriate locations, 
quality of turbines and maintenance. Spreading support over the lifetime of low-
carbon projects allows support to be linked to project performance, thus generating 
incentives for effective implementation, installation and operation.  
 
This type of support can be provided through feed-in tariffs, which provide long-term 
guarantees to buy renewable energy, often above market prices. Thus additional 
revenues are provided to investors, but are conditional upon project delivery, while 
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the guaranteed price reduces investment risk and financing costs. International 
support could provide grants to contribute towards these incremental costs.  
 
A similar form of operational support is the CDM, which allows off-set credits to be 
sold to developed countries. Administrative complexity, however, limits the regional 
and sectoral scope of its application, particularly for smaller scale or complex 
projects, and the uncertainty in demand for offsets, and resultant price volatility, has 
resulted in significant discounting of the value of offsets in financing decisions. In 
addition to direct support, there are three additional options for international support 
to enhance the ability of domestic governments to implement low-carbon investment 
frameworks.  
 
First, domestic efforts to reduce energy subsidies increase the value of energy savings 
and thus enhance the profitability of energy-efficiency measures. International support 
can help to address some of the political economy barriers to achieving this, and 
facilitate the transition by supporting adoption and diffusion of energy-efficient 
technologies.  
 
Second, domestic carbon pricing schemes such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade 
schemes with auctions increase the costs of carbon-intensive processes, products and 
services. This creates market opportunities and enhances the profitability of low-
carbon projects. International support can facilitate the implementation of carbon 
pricing and contribute to policy stability by increasing low-carbon opportunities 
through financial support, technical co-operation, technical assistance and capacity 
building.  
 
Third, technical assistance grants can also focus on the removal of some of the 
constraints in the wider investment environment which may limit investment, e.g. 
grants to improve the capacity of regulatory authorities or improve the ability of 
commercial financial institutions to assess applications for finance for low-carbon 
projects. 
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2.3. Equity, Loan, or Risk Coverage 
 
To clarify the relative merits of equity, loan and risk coverage for providing finance 
targeted to low-carbon projects, a distinction can be drawn between mechanisms that 
transfer risk to the public sector and mechanisms under which the public sector share 
in risk through the provision of capital. 
 
The main option to transfer risks to the public sector are insurance or guarantee 
products. They are logically suited to cover currency, country and policy risk, which 
are largely determined by public policy decisions. This would encourage the 
simultaneous provision of credit risk guarantees and development of an attractive 
investment framework, with enhanced credibility of the overall domestic policy 
framework, possibly through contracts where two countries declare themselves to be 
jointly and severally liable. 
 
The amount of compensation provided can be full or partial. They can also be 
provided just to creditors or to all providers of capital. Alternative government 
support schemes can be structured so that private insurance companies take the first 
hit and governments back insurance companies, e.g. to cover systematic risks.  
 
Such products can provide protection against certain specific events that cause non-
performance, e.g. political instability, or against general non-performance. However, 
if risk guarantees are expanded to encompass the majority of potential risk 
components, then it is more justified for public agencies to provide direct loans or 
equity, thus avoiding complexities and transaction costs.  
  
The other principal means for the public sector to improve access to finance is by 
direct provision of capital on terms that are advantageous compared to that which 
would be available from private capital markets. Typically corporate and project 
finance will rely on a mix of credit and equity finance, balancing their specific risks 
(Myers, 1984). The capital provided governments can accordingly either be debt 
capital (loans) or equity capital, depending on the requirements of the 
project/enterprise and the risk aversion of the public investor. Debt does not dilute the 
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shareholdings of existing owners; however excessive leverage (or weak creditor 
supervision) may introduce both moral hazard problems and, in case of 
underperformance, the leverage effect can be reversed into a trap. Equity finance 
dilutes shareholdings but has the advantage of providing new funders with access to 
information, as well as aligning incentives between fund providers and entrepreneurs. 
 
In summary, loans or, potentially, equity contributions are preferable where 
comprehensive risk coverage is necessary. Risk guarantees would be best focused on 
currency, country and, potentially, policy risk components. Section four will introduce 
additional considerations from the perspective of the supply side which might 















































3. Instruments to provide Financial Support 
 
Although the typology set out above is helpful for clarifying distinctions in the 
properties of different instruments, hybrid instruments will make an important 
contribution in the real world. Many program of public support combine different 
mechanisms within an overall package.  
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In this section, we outline the different support mechanisms that are available for use 
by the public sector to stimulate private-sector engagement, discuss options for these 
mechanisms to be made available by different parties and to different parties, and then 
consider the factors that might lead one mechanism to be preferred over another. 
 
Using the categorization of potential support set out in the previous section (Table 1), 
the table below presents examples of the support falling into each of the different 
categories. It also shows that international support can either be targeted directly to 
specific projects and local implementing agencies or that it can back national efforts 
of support provision.  




Grant payments are made by the public sector to help reduce the capital costs of a 
project or, more typically, to provide complementary institutional support (technical 
assistance, capacity building, due diligence support, etc.). To trigger low-carbon 
carbon investments, grants are helpful when the capital costs of the low-carbon 
technology are greater than the costs of a fossil-based technology. This is the 
philosophy of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), whose mandate is to pay the 
“incremental cost” of global environmental projects. However, the bulk of grants for 
supporting particular projects continue to be provided by national governments, often 
in the context of bilateral overseas development assistance.   
 
One specific case of such grants is devoted to technical assistance with the objective 
of removing constraints on investment by, for example, improving the capacity of 
regulatory authorities or the ability of financial institutions. These grants are provided 
by multilateral and bilateral financial institutions and can leverage significant amounts 
of private capital in the medium to long term.  
 
It is worth noting that concerns (as expressed above), about the risk of moral hazard 
problems involved in such grants, have prompted some innovations to prevent these 
risks. For instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
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supports energy-efficiency projects in Eastern Europe but only provides grants ex 
post, when the projects are accredited as having delivered the identified improvements 
(Table 2). Contingent grants take the form of a grant up to the point when the project 
meets a criterion for success, at which point it transfers to a loan. Conversely, on 
some occasions, contingent grants are converted to loans only if the project fails. This 
approach is designed to provide strong incentives for project success. Encouragingly, 
the local financial sector has developed instruments that cover the gap: for instance, 




Rather than supporting the upfront capital outlay of a project, public contributions can 
provide ongoing support. This can take the form of a subsidy to the firm/project or to 
its customers, to compensate them for any increase in prices that they experience. 
Such support schemes are best known for renewable energy typically in the form of 
feed-in tariffs or tradable certificates. This can be made also through the CDM which 
allows operators to sell CDM credits for every tonne of CO2 avoided through 
implementation of their project. 
  
Operating support has the main benefit of improved incentive properties – private-
sector actors will aim to implement projects rapidly and choose suitable quality and 
maintenance parameters, so as to receive ongoing support. In developed countries, the 
incremental costs created by renewable support schemes are typically allocated to 
electricity users, so as to avoid subsidies to energy consumption. However, should 
such costs become significant in developing countries, then international support 
could either contribute directly towards these costs, or could support energy-
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Direct support  Indirect support   




National to project 
Up-front grant 
- Standard 
Technical assistance grants 
- ‘Smart’ grants 
GEF grants 
Other bilateral and 
multilateral DFIs 
























































*Removal of energy 
subsidies 
* Carbon tax/cap 
and trade scheme 
Provision of equity 
- Private equity 
- Venture capital 
- long-term investment 
ADB Clean Energy 





support for VC 
fund setup costs, 
and co-
investment in 





Provision of debt and 
equity 
- Loans (usually with 
governance conditions) 
- Credit lines 
- Equity (large projects, 
IFIs e.g. EBRD, IFC 




































- Full or partial guarantee 
- Policy to cover all or 
specific causes of non 
performance  
- Other financial products 







Export credit agency 
guarantees 
 
Table 2. Example of public finance mechanisms provided by different institutions 
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Public support can come in the form of debt capital on terms that are advantageous 
compared to the terms available in private capital markets: longer tenors, reflected in 
longer period of time before repayment must be made or lower interest rates. These 
loans are most often provided by international financial institutions (IFI), like the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), other parts of the World Bank (WB) group, 
or the EBRD. To augment the leveraging potential of these loans, a part of it is often 
syndicated to other (private) lenders.  
 
As well as by IFIs, providing debt capital to projects can be also performed by 
specialised agencies of national government, mostly in cases where there is perceived 
to be an important benefit to having the loan on the host country’s balance sheet (e.g. 
“strategic infrastructure”). This encourages the host country government to implement 
sound and reliable regulatory frameworks. In addition, the IMF is an example of an 
IFI which provides loans to national governments, although this is primarily to 
promote macroeconomic stability rather than support the growth of specific sectors. 
 
Credit Lines for On-lending 
 
As well as direct provision of debt capital to projects, credit lines can be provided to 
local Financial Institutions (FI) for on-lending, typically towards projects that meet 
certain criteria. The intention is that the credit line provided to the local FI should 
form only part of the debt that is lent on, and that, in turn, the total debt made 
available from the local FI will leverage other forms of (equity) capital. Consequently, 
the total value of the projects undertaken should significantly exceed the size of the 
credit line. UNEP (2008) reports that leverage rates associated with credit lines are 
typically 2x to 4x the value of the credit line.  
 
The structure of these facilities vary, depending on the interest rate charged to the 
local FI, whether there are any conditions placed on the local FI’s on-lending, and 
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whether the local FI has any recourse to the provider of the credit line in the event that 
specific projects fail. 
 
These facilities have the advantage of being able to use the existing distribution 
networks of financial institutions in a host country and hence are often most suitable 
for large numbers of small diffuse projects. They are typically provided both by IFIs – 
e.g. the EBRD has extended a number of credit lines to support energy-efficiency 
projects in various countries of Eastern Europe – as well as by national governments, 
e.g. the government of Thailand provides credit lines to local FIs for energy-
efficiency investment, with the credit lines underpinned by revenues from a petroleum 
tax. The US Export-Import bank provides an example of a bank facilitating the 
financing of equipment export from a developed to developing economies.  
 
In any situation in which debt capital is provided, it is possible for the debt to be 
either senior or subordinated. This relates to the order in which cash flows are 
allocated to creditors in the case of insolvency: senior debt holders receive their 
interest/principal repayments in priority to subordinated debt holders. As public 
provision of subordinated debt implies lower risk for private senior debt providers, 




While equity capital can be provided by the public sector to finance specific projects, 
or parastatal companies (e.g. Eskom in South Africa), it is (more) often invested in 
funds specializing in investment in specific geographical regions and/or technologies, 
with the funds allocating capital to specific projects. This provides both specialization 
and diversification benefits to the providers of the equity capital. Two main sorts of 
equity fund can be distinguished: private equity/infrastructure funds and venture 
capital funds. In addition, Sovereign Wealth Funds have adopted elements of the 
private equity investment approach, but with investments potentially held for longer 
periods. As risks for investments in least developed countries and new technologies 
are larger, often policy-related, and therefore more difficult to assess, there might be a 
justification for more public-sector investment to provide equity to enhance the scale 
of private-sector activities for low-carbon development.  
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Private Equity and Infrastructure Funds 
 
These funds invest equity, often leverage with significant amounts of debt, into 
established companies in search of additional capital to expand. In some cases, 
Investment Banks take on equity stakes in projects, typically for a short-term period 
of 1-3 years, with the aim of restructuring a company. However, most of these funds 
have been invested in existing facilities such as ports or networks, and very few in 
large-scale new-build facilities.  
 
In the event that private-sector investors in such funds consider the risk profile of the 
projects in which the fund specialises to be too risky, the public sector can play a role 
by providing part of their equity capital. This role is typically played by both bilateral 
and multilateral financial institutions. Cases include the Asia Development Bank’s 
five Clean Energy Private Equity investment funds and investments by the IFC in a 
private equity fund investing in Asian clean energy technology (where funding is also 
supplied by Swedfund – a risk capital company of the Swedish government – and 
Proparco, the private-sector financing arm of the French Development Agency.) 
Providing equity to funds is generally considered to be associated with reasonably 
high leverage potential, reflecting the fact that the equity investment has more volatile 
returns and therefore requires taking on more risk. 
 
Venture Capital Funds and Other Early-Stage Equity Finance 
 
These funds provide equity to emerging companies engaged in the development of 
new, potentially breakthrough, technologies that can change whole industries. As 
such, the risk associated with these funds is greater than for private equity funds and 
the corresponding expected returns are higher.  
 
The public sector plays much the same role as for private equity funds although, in the 
case of low-carbon technologies, the need for public investment is likely to be greater, 
given the additional market failure problems associated with innovation and the fact 
that many of the concerned sectors are very capital-intensive.  Most of the few 
examples of this form of support are from national governments, e.g. the UK Carbon 
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Trust Venture Capital Fund and the Qatar-UK Clean Technology Investment Fund, 
both supported by their respective governments.  
 
Several factors suggest that private Venture Capital funds (VCs) may only offer a 
partial solution to the early-stage funding problem. VCs are focused on a trade sale to 
incumbent companies or Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) on the stock market as a way 
of realizing large investment proceeds. Therefore, VCs are focused on best-of-breed 
companies. In combination, this means that even in the best of times VCs will only 
invest in a minority of “superstar” companies. Yet the policy challenge is to stimulate 
wider diffusion of technology: the returns from a widely diffused technology may 
frequently be just above market average, which is insufficient to attract VC funding.  
 
This points to the need for alternative equity finance sources for early-stage 
companies. Business angels are generally seen as the most important source of seed 
funding for start-up companies in the USA and EU. They are also typically a provider 
of more “patient” capital. Alternative direct investment might be used towards setting 
up or scaling up key intermediaries, e.g. in re-capitalising national or regional 
development banks and scaling up their activities. Such models may be particularly 
important in micro-diffusion, e.g. urban photovoltaic (PV) installations and energy-
efficiency retrofitting. 
 
Insurance / Guarantee Products 
 
The main form of support which increases access to finance consists of guarantee 
products. Guarantees are financial instruments which transfer risk by either attributing 
some responsibility to the guarantor for the performance of another person or entity, 
or by allocating losses to them in the event of failure. The guarantor provides 
protection to the buyer of protection with respect to the performance of a third party 
(Kothari, 2007).  
 
Insurance products have an economically equivalent effect to that of guarantee 
products although there can be some technical differences, e.g. insurance products 
tend to focus on the loss suffered by the party buying the product – and hence are 
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typically bilateral arrangements – while guarantees tend to relate to the non-
performance of a third party.  
 
Although both insurance and guarantee products are available from the private sector, 
the public sector can offer preferential rates, extend the scope of the coverage,
2 or 
provide some form of reinsurance. 
 
Products can differ depending on whether they pay out in response to non-
performance irrespective of the reason or due to specific reasons. Examples of the 
former include IFC’s direct debt substitutes or ADB’s partial credit guarantees. 
Political risk cover provided by MIGA, a World Bank organization, is an example of 
the latter; this provides cover for Foreign Direct Investment in relation to 
expropriation, currency transfer restrictions, war and civil disturbance and breach of 
contract. The instruments can also differ depending on whether coverage is available 
to protect lenders only or both debt and equity investors, and whether the coverage 
provided is full or partial (the latter is often preferred by providers to alleviate moral 
hazard concerns). 
 
For partial guarantees, for debt investors, products can be designed either to 
specifically cover debt service of later maturing debt (appropriate when commercial 
lenders are unwilling to provide a financing tenor long enough to match the cash flow 
of a project) or alternatively a portion of payments throughout the borrowing term. 
Partial credit guarantees also vary depending on whether, in the event of non-
performance, any recovered monies are proportionately shared by the guarantor and 
the creditor (a pari passu guarantee structure) or whether the creditor has a priority on 
all recovered monies (subordinated structure). As in the earlier discussion, a public 
guarantee that involves the public sector assuming more risk (subordinated guarantee) 
is typically associated with higher leverage than provision of debt with lower risk. 
Often products are only available, or available on significantly more preferential 
terms, if matched by a counter-guarantee by a host government.  
 
                                                 
2   This may not be concessional pricing, but rather reflect the fact that the public sector can control the 
risk more effectively and hence can offer better terms.  
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As well as international support for projects, national governments frequently 
guarantee products for their exporters through export credit agencies. The World 
Bank also offers Partial Credit Guarantees (PCGs) to support government borrowing 





There are other ways of alleviating risks and hence improving access to finance: 
 
National or international bodies could offer financial instruments to underpin the 
carbon price in a particular country. Such instruments include contracts for difference 
(a contract between a buyer and a seller of an asset, specifying that the buyer will 
receive from the seller the difference between the current value of the asset and its 
value at contract time) and put options (a contract where the buyer purchases the right 
to sell the asset at a contractually agreed price) (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009). 
 
The public sector can provide equity/debt investment to private-sector providers of 
guarantee/insurance products or other risk mitigation activities. For instance, the 
Currency Exchange Fund (TCX)
3 is a fund that offers those investing in developing 
markets the opportunity to hedge their local currency risk through selling currency 
and interest rate derivative products, initially to those who have invested in the fund. 
The fund mitigates its risk through having a diversified geographic base coupled with 
a first-loss tranche of capital provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other 
investors include DFIs such as the African Development Bank, EBRD and KfW and 
ABN AMRO.  
 
                                                 
3   TCX (2009) ‘The Currency Exchange Fund N.V.’, May. Available at: 
http://www.tcxfund.com/smartsite.dws?ch=TCX&id=1617  
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Pooling of asset classes in climate technology diffusion is likely to be another 
important channel for improving finance. Mortgage-backed securitization is seen as 
one of the key culprits for the financial crisis. At the same time, the securitization 
methods underlying MBS have been well-proven, over many years, and have been 
used to stimulate the development of HP/lend-lease markets, credit card receivables 
and other liability classes. One applications of securitization to climate change 
technology could be funding large scale retrofitting of energy-saving technologies in 
households (where the payoff may be over 20 years or more), or energy-efficient 
transport-fleet financing. Therefore government support for securitization (e.g. 
guaranteeing a portion of the income to investors) would make it cheaper to buy an 
electrical pick-up truck, compared to a diesel truck.  
 
Finally, existing microfinance schemes can be used to stimulate diffusion of clean 
cooking and domestic technologies in developing economies.  


























Text Box 3. Case study Energy Efficiency - EBRD energy-efficiency credit lines  
 
Often, packages of support provided by DFIs make use of a number of different instruments in 
concert to promote private-sector engagement. A paradigmatic case of this is provided by the 
EBRD credit lines for financing energy-efficiency and renewables investments in the
residential, municipal, SME and industrial sectors in various countries across Central Europe 
to Central Asia.  
 
The scheme makes use of four separate instruments, each designed to target a specific barrier 
to private sector engagement: 
 
Credit lines are made available to local banks for on-lending, at the banks’ risk, to (part) 
finance energy efficiency and renewable investments in the industrial, SME, residential 
and municipal sectors. Although provided on commercial rates to participating banks, 
these help to overcome the problem that required tenors can often be longer than those 
typically provided for business lending. 
Problems of technical expertise are tackled through technical assistance packages, 
resulting in e.g. consultants providing free-energy efficiency advice, assisting potential 
borrowers in preparing loan applications, building the capacity of loan officers in local 
banks to understand and evaluate energy-efficiency investments.  
In many instances, performance fees of 1-2% of the eligible loan value are paid to the 
bank upon agreement of the on-loan, helping to overcome concerns that banks may have 
about market demand and potential misperceptions of risk 
Capital grants covering between 7.5% and 20% of the capital cost of specific projects 
are disbursed when the project is accredited as delivering the improvements identified, 
helping to overcome straightforward cost problems.  
The relative importance attached to each of these different instruments differs across the 
countries in which the schemes haven been implemented.  
 
To date, framework credit lines in excess of €850m have been agreed, with 11 schemes 
operational across nine countries/regions. A further two schemes are expected to be 
introduced in 2009, with framework credit lines totalling €120m. Up to the end of 2008, the 
EBRD reported that €362m had been disbursed across 25 banks and that this, in turn, had 
supported more than 24,500 sub-loans.  
 
The schemes to date have been successful at both leveraging private-sector capital and 
reducing CO2 emissions. Across a typical cross-section of countries, leverage rates of 
between 0.1x and 1.5x have been achieved when measured against all EBRD contributions, 
and between 5.8x and 70.5x when measured against the subsidy component of the EBRD 
support. Subsidy per tonne of annual CO2 saving varies between €5 and €235, depending 
















Text Box 4. Self-Sustaining Markets in Solar Homes Systems in the Developing World 
 
Many homes in rural areas in the developing world lack electricity because they are remote 
and there are insufficient funds to connect them to the grid. Such households typically rely 
on biomass fuels, kerosene and batteries for their heating, lighting and  electrical appliances. 
Small-scale solar PV systems can act as a low-cost means of rural electrification. However, 
self-sustaining markets in such solar homes systems (SHS) often do not tend to emerge 
without some degree of public support, because even small systems are nevertheless 
expensive for many households, and both households and distributors may lack access to 
credit. 
 
The WB and IFC, working in tandem with the Global Environment Facility, have supported 
the development of SHS markets in over 20 countries (IFC, 2007; Miller, 2009), with 
varying degrees of success. Such interventions typically need to simultaneously tackle more 
than one barrier to market development, often related to financial infrastructure. For 
example, potential customers may lack access to credit, distributors may be unable to raise 
loans for inventory and recruitment without collateral, and consumers may have low 
confidence in an unfamiliar technology. Rural areas by definition imply higher overheads 
for distribution and after-sales service, and initial low sales volumes create few 
opportunities for economies of scale for distributors. 
 
The public support offered typically takes the form of: concessional refinancing of small 
loans to consumers by micro-finance institutions and local banks; provision of direct 
incentives to dealers in the form of installation grants;  technical assistance in the form of 
grants for staff training or development of quality standards; and concessional loans and 
guarantees offered to dealers to supplement their working capital. Social enterprises may be 
key distributors in addition to, or instead of, profit-making enterprises. 
 
Two countries where efforts to develop the market for SHSs have been particularly 
successful are Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, credit institutions borrow money on 
concessional terms to on-lend to dealers and customers. In Bangladesh, concessional loans 
to refinance consumer credit have been disbursed to dealers. In addition, a major 
Bangladeshi SHS social enterprise, Grameen Shakti, was support by an IFC/GEF (Global 
Environmental Facility) loan at an early stage of its development. Installation grants have 
also been deployed in both countries. 
 
These two countries have seen an exponential increase in sales of SHS units, with hundreds 
of thousands of units now installed. However, specific circumstances related to country 
characteristics or timing of support may have played a part in this success. The experience 
of Bangladesh and other countries such as Kenya and Papua New Guinea suggest that 
making use of existing social ties and infrastructure created by micro-finance lenders or 
large employers can be a significant factor in scheme success.  
  
These case studies are based on research and analysis undertaken for UNEP (2009b). 
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4. Experience with the Provision of Support through the Different Mechanisms 
 
Investment is financed predominantly through private sources. However, a wide array 
of public and not-for-profit organizations play a role in facilitating these investment 
flows, including development institutions, investment promotion agencies, 
international institutions and philanthropic organizations. Typical current annual 
financial flows via the organizations/mechanisms identified are presented in Table 2 
(for all purposes, not solely those which are climate change-related). 
 
They will all have a role to play in financing the investment needed to build a low-
carbon economy. Every organization has its distinct profile and comparative 
advantages, which it derives from its mandate, expertise, governance structure, size 
and location and it makes sense to use organizations according to their specific 
strengths. Without undertaking any organization-specific diagnostics, we can surmise 
how the needed financial instruments might best be deployed. 
 
Grant support may most naturally be provided through bilateral development 
agencies such as the UK’s DFID, Sweden’s SIDA or the USA’s USAID. These 
organizations currently support individual projects, and, increasingly, to governments 
in the context of mutually agreed poverty reduction strategies or similar plans. A 
share of their funding is channelled through multilateral development banks or the 
UN, often via dedicated facilities such as the Clean Investment Funds or the UN-
REDD Programme Fund. An organization that specifically provides environmental 
grants (covering the incremental cost of a globally beneficial activity like GHG 
mitigation) is the GEF. The GEF serves as the financial mechanism to the UNFCCC, 
which means that most Convention-related finance is channelled through the GEF. 
Philanthropic institutions and NGOs complement traditional development aid in 
important ways, usually focusing on small-scale projects and the grassroots level.  
 
Public finance, and technical assistance concerning the policy environment, is the 
purview of multilateral development agencies such as the WB and regional 
development banks. Also active in this field are bilateral development banks such as 
Germany’s KfW. These are the organizations that could most naturally support, for 
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example, the development of renewable support programs such as a national feed-in 
tariff. UN agencies like the UNEP and FAO are also strong on technical assistance, 
often smaller-scale and more narrowly focused, but they do not generally provide 
finance. 
 
Commercial finance and risk coverage need to be provided by organizations with 
an explicit private-sector focus and mandate. Experience has shown that differences in 
corporate culture can be an important barrier to the effective implementation of 
public-private partnerships (see UNEP, 2009b). Organizations with this comparative 
advantage include export credit agencies at the bilateral level and international 
financial institutions with a private-sector orientation (e.g. IFC and EBRD). 
 
Using existing organizations and leveraging their strengths has the advantage of 
drawing on decades of relevant experience. But there are risks, beyond the fact that 
not all organizations have an equally good track record, that existing institutions 
would not wholeheartedly endorse the new objectives and adjust their workings 
accordingly, and would see climate change finance as a means to pursue their original 
objectives. This is why there is a role for new institutions set up for specific purposes 
but making them operational will take much longer, and risks duplication with 
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Direct support  Indirect support   
Public Finance 
Mechanism   International to project 
International to 
national 
National to project 
Up-front grant 
 
GEF: $735 million 
3




Initiative (Germany): $160 
million
3 
UN-REDD Fund: $50 
million
4 


















































Primary global CDM market: 
$2-3 billion  




Fossil fuel subsidies in 20 




government support for 




EU ETS market: $92 billion 
3 
Provision of equity 
 




AfDB: $220 million 
3 
EBRD: $1.6 billion 
3 
n/a 
Example: UK Carbon Trust 
has co-invested $10.8 million 
since inception  






Cool Earth Partnership 
(Japan): $1.6 billion
5 
IMF: $0.7 billion 
2






Provision of debt 
 
Unclear split between sovereign and non-sovereign 
lending 
IADB: $11.1 billion 
3 
EBRD: $5.9 billion 
3 
Diffuse examples of 
governments lending to 
businesses, often for specific 
policy purposes (SME 


































  MIGA guarantees: value of 
$1-1.5 billion per annum
1. 
Actual payouts are very rare, 
amounting to only a few 
million. 
WB PCGs: $1.6 billion 
since 1990 
WB PRGs: $0.8 billion 
since 1994 
 
IFC guarantees: $1.8 
billion per annum 
3 
Export credit agency 
guarantees: e.g. UK $1.8 
billion
4, USAID $0.2 billion
2, 
US Ex-Im Bank Sub-Saharan 
Africa $575million.
4 
OECD to IDA countries only: 
$1.3 billion per annum 
2 
 
Table 3. Illustrative values of different financing mechanisms
4 
                                                 
4  Sources: World Bank (2009b); EBRD (2009); IADB (2009); AfDB (2009); ADB (2009); GEF 
(2009); OECD (2009a); OECD (2009b); Capoor and Ambrosi (2009); IFC (2008); Carbon Trust 
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A key challenge for all organizations, old or new, will be scaling. Financing needs for 
mitigation and adaptation have been estimated at close to $500 billion a year by 2030 
(World Bank, 2009). This is about five times the current level of official development 
assistance, and ten times the IFIs' annual lending volume. No single public institution 
has the capacity to administer this volume of flows or, indeed, to ensure effective use 
in a context of limited absorptive capacity. 
 
Moreover, efficiency in implementation may not be the only concern and cannot be 
disconnected from the question of governance i.e. ownership and control. This has 
proven to be a crucial issue because, among developing countries, there is a fair 
amount of distrust and disillusion with existing international financial institutions, in 
particular the GEF. There has been a strong push, therefore, for institutions in which 
developing countries can feel a stronger sense of ownership. At the same time, 
developed countries want to maintain some control over the use of the resources they 
provide. In the case of climate change adaptation, the result of this tension has been a 
dedicated new institution, the Adaptation Fund, which has a governance structure 
acceptable to all. It is an untested question whether a similarly suitable governance 
structure can be developed that allows a multilateral mitigation fund to make effective 
decisions on sector and country specific needs for effective implementation of low-
carbon development strategies.  
 
Figure 6 illustrates the relative size of different mechanisms of development and 
climate co-operation, using areas proportional to their volume listed in Table 2. It 
shows that the majority of grants are provided in bilateral co-operation to 
governments in developing countries. In contrast, almost all products promoting 
access to finance (or providing finance) are provided through multilateral 
organization, with the larger share provided to individual projects and programs.  
                                                                                                                                            
(2009).  USAID (2009), Export Credits Guarantee Departmnet (2009), Export Import Bank of the 
United States (2008) 





5 Based on total figure of $10 billion for 5 years announced in 2008.
6 These figures do not 
imply that developing countries have benefitted from financing of the same magnitude as these are 
estimates of the value of EPRAs closed in 2008 and actual payments would depend on project 
registration and performance. 












































































































Figure 6 Mapping needs for low-carbon development through mechanisms to 
institutions (Please note figure is illustrative and does not translate volumes of debt 
into grant-equivalent values) 
 
First, the shares of the different support mechanisms required to facilitate low-carbon 
transitions in developing countries need to be considered in allocating funds and 
designing institutions. The examples discussed in Section 3 suggest that both access 
to finance and grants have a relevant share. 
 
Second, if bilateral mechanisms provided the majority of grant support, then 
commitments to provide support through bilateral co-operation and hypothecation of 
auction revenue from national emissions trading schemes would have to match the 
needs for grant support of developing countries. 
 
Third, if multilateral mechanisms are to provide the majority of grant-equivalent 
support through capital provision, then again they need to be equipped with the 
corresponding resources. This has two components. (i) pledges of soft money that can 
be used to complement (subsidize) commercial lending and cover the incremental 
costs of low-carbon options. This could take the form of IDA-style replenishment 
rounds. It is money that can be "used up", as it does not count against the share 
capital.  (ii) Capital increases in IFIs  
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Fourth, public risk guarantees and insurances are currently provided to a limited 
extent by multilateral organizations and to a larger extent by national governments. 
Multilateral organizations struggle to expand their provision of such guarantees, as 
this requires reserving capital on their balance sheets. National governments are less 
constrained, as they can underwrite debt or risk guarantees. Risk guarantees, either 
provided in a bilateral manner or issued by national governments to allow 
multinational organizations to provide additional debt, are therefore likely to play a 
far stronger role in future climate co-operation, and will also require more careful 
monitoring to avoid undue exposure of individual actors and countries. 
 
5. Climate Finance as part of a Decarbonisation Strategy 
 
The above sections can be read as taxonomy of available mechanisms to support 
carbon abatement initiatives. However this toolbox will not be capable to redirect 
capital flows towards low-carbon intensive infrastructures in developing countries on 
the scale of $140 – $675 billion a year for mitigation and $30 – $100 billion for 
adaptation, as estimated by the recent WB Development Report (World Bank, 2009) 
unless used within a consistent view of the reforms of global finance. 
 
We will indeed enter a learning process about how to mobilize the various elements of 
the toolbox so as to make investors and firms perceive the low-carbon technologies 
and strategies as lower risk options. The risk is, in the absence of fully-fledged carbon 
markets, associated with the difficulty of how to decide on which sectors, firms or 
projects receive the support and what volume of support is granted.  
 
In other words some consistency rules are needed to minimize the costs of the 
fragmentation of funding mechanisms. A “social value of carbon” could serve as a 
reference price in all these mechanisms and could express the political will the 
international community to meet some long-term GHGs concentration target. More 
precisely, this is a series of values increasing in time in order to respect an emissions 
trajectory consistent with a long-term objective. Obviously, this value is uncertain but 
modelling literature provides orders of magnitude and, ultimately, this value will be a 
matter of political negotiation. 
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Also, sector specific assessments might be pursued to identify the potential 
transformational impacts. Support would only be granted if the overall transformation 
approach promises success. The volume of support could be tailored to the 
incremental costs incurred or the costs of removing barriers for the transformation. 
 
A reform of international funding to provide support based on a social value of carbon 
and transformational opportunities would constitute a credible offer that the Annex 1 
countries could make within the current political and economical constraints. It is 
clear indeed that aid alone will not suffice in meeting the financial needs, as the usual 
drivers of donor fatigue will be exacerbated in the context of economic crisis and of a 
re-calibration of global economic wealth (rendering the North/South division line an 
inaccurate Rich/Poor division line). But this does not change the fact that, given their 
past responsibilities in causing the problem, the Annex 1 countries have the 
responsibility of proposing a framework to trigger flows of climate oriented funding 
to the South. Margins of freedom exist because the problem is not so much one of 
capital shortage at the aggregated level as with a problem of misdirection of savings.  
 
A social value of carbon could obviously first be used in concessionary funding, but it  
could also been used to leverage private and public finance through the development 
of risk mitigation instruments targeted at climate-friendly investment, and of financial 
assets capable of realigning and increasing households’ savings in the direction of 
such investments, while securing the liquidity of the lent money. Indeed, the 
challenge is to reconcile the desire of borrowers and investors, to secure long term 
funding on infrastructure projects, with the desire of the lenders to hedge against 
investment risks and to readily access money.  
 
This paper cannot go beyond pointing out the necessity of further research, but it is 
worth noting that securing an increase in the power of climate-oriented funding, 
insurance and re-insurance mechanisms requires two major building blocks. The first 
is the collection of households savings in bonds or liquid deposit accounts dedicated 
to carbon-saving investments which could be paid at – as a minimum – interest rates 
akin to those of similar financial products, due to the lower risk-premium attached to 
the loans funding these investments. There would be the additional benefit from the 
rise of an environmental ethic in public opinion (fair trade products, ethical funds). 
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The second is the reform of the banking system itself. The financial crisis is basically 
due to the development of a “shadow banking system” relying on a form of a 
commerce of promises. A ‘social value of carbon’ could be a component of the 
reform of international financial systems and used to incentivizing banks to provide 
more credit for low-carbon or carbon-saving activities.  This starts by allowing lower 
deposits for such activities, with the risk borne by the Central Banks of Annex 1 
countries and re-insured through an arrangement akin to Special Drawing Rights at 
the IMF, backed by new deposits from the same Central Banks.  This is not the place 
to discuss the details of such a system, but to invite the best specialists in the field to 




The shift to low-carbon development trajectories requires that private and public 
sector investment choices be shifted from energy-inefficient and carbon-intensive 
infrastructure and technologies towards low-carbon choices.  
 
Governments have to provide domestic policy frameworks to attract and shift the 
corresponding investment volumes. International climate change support is not about 
aid, with donors and recipients, but about cooperation between the developed and 
developing countries towards implementing the necessary policy framework, with 
each party contributing according to their means and their common but differentiated 
responsibilities. Financial mechanisms can support the implementation of the policy 
framework by contributing to incremental costs, creating incentives to maintain 
effective frameworks and thus enhancing regulatory stability, and by facilitating 
access to finance for low-carbon investments. 
 
This paper starts with an assessment of financial needs of private actors that need to 
be addressed to facilitate low-carbon choices. These needs differ across technologies, 
sectors, and countries. They can require contribution to incremental costs or 
facilitation of access to finance. Even within these categories needs differ, and can 
require support up-front or support during operation, or improved access to finance 
through risk guarantees, the provision of loans or equity contributions.  
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Governments already use all these categories of instruments, to support private actors 
within their countries as well as in international cooperation to support developing 
countries or actors in developing countries. However, the different volumes of support 
provided across the instruments suggest that the choice of financial instruments is also 
linked to the institution able to provide it.  
 
  Bilateral co-operation offers the flexibility to tailor a grant to the specific 
needs of a sector or country, and might therefore be the preferred option to 
facilitate transition strategies. Only where incremental costs are clearly 
defined, e.g. with technology demonstration projects, are multilateral 
organizations more able to use standardized methodologies to offer grant 
support.  
  Multilateral organizations offer a stronger track record in the provision and 
management of loans and project finance, e.g. for infrastructure development.  
  Risk hedging instruments like project and currency risk guarantees are likely 
to play an increasing role, as they tackle a main barrier for the access to 
finance for investors in low-carbon technologies and sectors. They can be 
provided both bilaterally and through multi-lateral bodies. 
 
Many of these mechanisms provide effective support while being less of a burden on 
balance sheets and current accounts. For example, if governments issue credit 
guarantees, this may not have direct implications for balance sheets and current 
accounts, but can still offer effective help. It allows pension funds and other private 
investors to offer lower-cost capital and learn about new technologies and regulatory 
frameworks, thereby reducing the need for future public intervention. The provision 
of such support in parallel by many governments may allow private sector investment 
to reach critical mass: resulting in a “crowding in” of private sector investment. If the 
value of financial instruments such as loans, equity and risk guarantees is reported in 
terms of grant equivalent contribution, then a fair comparison of contributions by 
different actors with their commitments will be possible.  
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Ongoing reviews will be necessary to ensure effective use of scarce resources. It will 
be essential to anchor the different support frameworks in an overarching framework, 
preferably a UNFCCC umbrella, to create synergies of international co-operation, 
rather than risk fragmentation of efforts. Transparent reporting will be crucial to 
facilitate implementation of effective frameworks, rapid learning and accountability 
of all parties involved.  
 
Ultimately, this paper opens a broader perspective. Since the 2005 Gleneagles G8 
Summit, developed countries have asserted their willingness to link climate policies to 
the transformation of economic globalization, in a mutually beneficial process, and 
the prevention of new threats to security (energy, climate refugees and local political 
instability). The current financial crisis provides an impetus to make a step further in 
that direction, through linking the reform of financial systems to the decarbonization 
imperative, and by the same token shortening the duration of the economic crisis 
and/or to securing a steady exit from the crisis. Changing the patterns of international 
capital flows may be an opportunity to trigger and sustain a long wave of climate-
friendly infrastructure works in both developed and developing countries, which 
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